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ABSTRACT
Malware threat intelligence uncovers deep information about mal-
ware, threat actors, and their tactics, Indicators of Compromise
(IoC), and vulnerabilities in different platforms from scattered threat
sources. This collective information can guide decision making in
cyber defense applications utilized by security operation centers
(SoCs). In this paper, we introduce an open-source malware ontol-
ogy - MALOnt that allows the structured extraction of information
and knowledge graph generation, especially for threat intelligence.
The knowledge graph that uses MALOnt is instantiated from a
corpus comprising hundreds of annotated malware threat reports.
The knowledge graph enables the analysis, detection, classification,
and attribution of cyber threats caused by malware. We also demon-
strate the annotation process using MALOnt on exemplar threat
intelligence reports. A work in progress, this research is part of a
larger effort towards auto-generation of knowledge graphs (KGs)
for gathering malware threat intelligence from heterogeneous on-
line resources.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computer systems organization→ Embedded systems; Re-
dundancy; Robotics; • Networks→ Network reliability.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Malware attacks impact every industry that is enabled by Internet
technology — approximately 7.2 billion malware attacks were re-
ported worldwide in 20191. Such attacks cause loss, alteration, and
misuse of sensitive data and compromise system integrity. Malware
often have typical patterns corresponding to the type of industry
they attack, groups of attackers behind similar attacks and means
to pave their way into the target system, traces left behind after an
attack has taken place, and so on. For preventing and detecting fu-
ture attacks - both similar and disparate, the collection, integration,
and analysis of malware threat intelligence is crucial.
A malware ontology can support the construction of models
that can detect and track attacks from their initial stages (such as
identification of a vulnerability) through later stages (such as an
exploit or data compromise). An ontology acts as a blueprint of a
specific domain, containing key concepts (classes), their properties.
Restrictions on classes are defined to limit the scope of the class,
which is then inherited by the instances as well.
Therefore, it can facilitate the aggregation, representation, and
sharing of threat information which would otherwise be challeng-
ing to reproduce, reuse, and analyze at a large scale. Both human
and software agents can use an ontology to understand the struc-
ture of information that is stored in a document, a report, a blog,
a tweet, or any other structured, semi-structured, or unstructured
information source[11].
Specifically for malware threat, an ontology can provide a dictio-
nary of attacks and related information that can help SOC analysts
to dig deeper into their origination, attack goals, timeline, affiliated
actors, vulnerabilities exploited for the attack, impact on industries
as well as on humans. Such rich pieces of information can be ag-
gregated following the ontology classes and data properties, which
can significantly enhance current, future, and sometimes past anal-
ysis of online attacks, thereby curbing their propagation before a
malware becomes hard to contain. In the absence of an ontology,
security researchers and SoC analysts struggle to manage informa-
tion from multiple sources and rely on ad-hoc mechanisms. There
are existing attack and threat taxonomies that can be extended
to a knowledge graph, however, they have their limitations that
we cover in later sections. Linking common information between
threat sources also becomes complex and therefore researchers are
either compelled to look at attack instances in isolation or make do
with available context.
1https://tinyurl.com/yxs8h6aw
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The main contribution of this paper is MALOnt - an open-source
malware ontology2 which underpins the collection of malware
threat intelligence from disparate online sources. MALOnt con-
tains concepts ranging from malware characteristics to attack and
attacker details. For example, malware details may include fam-
ily details, attack vectors (software or hardware vulnerabilities)
deployed by an attacker, targeted operating system, impacted in-
dustries, history of attacks, and so on. MALOnt can be populated
with specific instances and thus, be expanded to generate a knowl-
edge graph (KG). A malware knowledge graph reasoner can infer
new facts through deduction or induction and relies on machine
learning and deep learning models to greatly expand the range
and scale of fact generation. MALOnt will be used as a baseline
framework for generating the KG, which is part of our ongoing
research. MALOnt is implemented to supplement malware threat
information extraction by following the steps below:
(1) Create MALOnt - an ontology for malware threat intelli-
gence.
(2) Create a malware knowledge graph by integrating malware-
related information with the ontology.
(3) Infer implicit intelligence from the knowledge graph using
an OWL (Web Ontology Language) reasoner.
These steps will be described in detail in Section 4.
2 BACKGROUND CONCEPTS
In this section, we cover key concepts that are used to create and
instantiate MALOnt.
2.1 Threat Reports
Figure 1: An excerpt of a threat report on Backdoor.Winnti
malware family
When a malware attack occurs or when a software vulnerabil-
ity is identified, a detailed account of these actions is captured by
researchers and security analysts in threat reports. Corrective mea-
sures are eventually taken to prevent further propagation of the
malware, and more evidence is added to the earlier documented
accounts. Threat reports are technical in nature and cover the in-
formation related to malware (a collective name for viruses, trojan,
ransomware, spyware) such as vulnerabilities exploited, operating
2https://github.com/shoron-dutta/MALOnt
system and applications impacted, modus operandi, group or cy-
bercriminal responsible, hash of the malware, first sighting of the
attack, determined IP addresses of attack server, and so on. Other
security analysts and researchers utilize these reports as a reliable
source to study and analyzemalware samples, adversary techniques,
exploited zero-day vulnerabilities, and much more. Figure 1 shows
a snippet from a sample threat report3 describing Backdoor.Win32
(Win64) malware family.
2.2 Ontology
An ontology broadly describes concepts within a domain through
classes and properties. These properties include property between
defined classes and their attributes. An ontology is usually de-
signed around a few main classes that cover the domain whose
scope has been pre-defined. These classes may have sub-classes
(more specific), super-classes (more general). The relationship be-
tween classes determines the type of interaction between them.
Instances are individual instantiated examples of a class, which
means each instances can have different values for data properties
and be connected to other instances via object properties. Three
classes - Malware, Location, andAttackerGroup, largely describe
a malware’s behavior. This can be vetted with the attack or vul-
nerability details captured in a few relevant threat reports. The
Malware class has two sub-classes - TrojanHorse and Dropper.
A property hasTargetLocation exists where the domain is deter-
mined by theMalware class and range by the Location class. Two
properties exist from AttackerGroup class to TrojanHorse and
Dropper classes titled usesTrojan and usesDropper respectively.
A property of the Dropper class is titled deliveredIn that repre-
sents the mechanism of how the dropper is delivered to the target
system.
To build an ontology, three main approaches are recommended
while also engaging human expertise to build them:
(1) Top-down - Classes are defined from the root of the class
hierarchy by identifying the most general classes first[5, 11,
18]. This approach is preferred when the goal of the ontology
is to represent distinctive features of a domain [18].
(2) Bottom-up - One starts with the leaves in the class hierarchy
and builds higher levels of abstraction along the way [5, 11,
18]. Relevant data sources can be used to identify concepts
that are expressed in the dataset.
(3) Middle-out - The most important classes are determined first
followed by the rest of the class hierarchy. It is a combination
of top-down and bottom-up approaches[5, 11].
To elaborate, refer to Figure 2, where we describe a few concepts
from MALOnt.
2.3 Knowledge Graphs
A knowledge graph is a machine-readable data repository contain-
ing a large amount of structured and unstructured data. This data
is stored as triples ⟨Subject, Predicate, Object⟩, where the predicate
indicates the relationship between a subject and an object. Each en-
tity or node in a knowledge graph has a unique identifier and may
be connected via properties. A unique identifier allows capturing
3https://tinyurl.com/y9e7m5w7
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Figure 2: Visual portrayal of a few top Classes in MALOnt
using VOWL plugin in Protege.
provenance information comprising references to threat sources
of the triples. The graph structure can be exploited for efficient
information extraction. Ontologies play a crucial role in building
knowledge graphs (KGs). One way to build a KG is by adding in-
dividual instances to the ontology classes, and properties [11]. In
addition to this, class and property instances outside of those de-
fined by the ontology can be added to an existing KG, which allows
for flexibility in KG generation. Consider the ontology explained in
subsection 2.2. When a small portion of the ontology is populated
with instances collected from threat reports, we get a small mal-
ware knowledge graph. Such as, the report titled “Oops, they did it
again: APT Targets Russia and Belarus with ZeroT and PlugX4” con-
tains information about an attacker group, which can be mapped
to AttackerGroup class. The attacker uses trojans - PlugX and
NetTraveler, to target infrastructures in Europe, Russia, Mongolia,
Belarus, among others. This attacker group uses a dropperMicrosoft
Compiled HTML Help (.chm) which is delivered via spear-phishing
involving bespoke emails. This information is mapped to MALOnt
classes (described in subsection 2.2), to generate a small part of the
malware knowledge graph, as visualized in Figure 3. A KG is not
just an instantiated data of an ontology. It is a web of properties
between individual nodes (also called entities) and uses a reasoner
to draw connections between entities that would otherwise not be
understood.
Threat Reports are annotated (see Figure 4) using annotation
tools such as Brat Rapid Annotation Tool[19], and INCEpTION
to create instances of classes defined in MALOnt. Here, the text
segments “PowerPoint file” and “installs malicious code” are labeled
as MALOnt classes titled Software and Vulnerability respectively.
The arrow from Software to Vulnerability denotes the semantic
relationship between these two classes hasVulnerability.
4https://tinyurl.com/yavqfb2y
Figure 3: Snippet of an exemplar malware knowledge graph
using neo4j
Figure 4: An annotated threat report using brat [19].
3 LITERATURE REVIEW
We corroborate the timeliness and necessity of MALOnt in this
section by explaining the gaps in existing approaches and by com-
paring it with the state of the art standards, taxonomies, and on-
tologies.
3.1 Existing Malware ontologies
Swimmer[21] presented one of the first classifications of malware
and their behavior using two classes: Malware and MalwareCharac-
teristic. Stucco[6] expressed functionalities for capturing informa-
tion on an attack although it lacked the means to store properties
such as malware type(dropper, trojan, etc.) or attacker’s location.
Unified Cyber Ontology (UCO)[22] is based on STIX[2] and other
cybersecurity standards and is mapped to vocabularies and sharing
standards in the cybersecurity domain, as well as external sources
such as DBPedia. To the best of our knowledge, the entire UCO is
not publicly available and is broader in scope when compared to
MALOnt. As normally practiced, some of the cybersecurity concepts
for basic classes (e.g.MalwareCharacteristic[21]) were imported,
however, MALOnt goes beyond describing just the malware attack
behavior. It also captures the impacted industries, malware propa-
gation mechanism, timeline, targeted system, prevention, and so
on.
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One might argue against the need for a malware ontology since
there exist quite a few standards and taxonomies, as well as on-
tologies in the cybersecurity domain that can be used to share
malware threat intelligence in a structured way. We compare some
of the most prominent ones with MALOnt here. MitreâĂŹs Com-
mon Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)5 dictionary identifies
publicly known security vulnerabilities in software packages. Com-
mon Attack Patterns Enumerations and Characteristics (CAPEC)6
provides an enumeration of repeated techniques in cyber attacks.
MitreâĂŹs Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowl-
edge (ATT&CK)7 provides a list of publicly known adversaries,
their techniques, and post-compromise tactics to achieve their ob-
jectives. OpenIOC8 is a standard format for sharing IOCs. CVE[9],
CAPEC[1], ATT&CK, and IoCs provide static information of al-
ready discovered malware artifacts about malware attacks (among
other information), which facilitates the representation and integra-
tion of collected information. STIX[2], a knowledge representation
standard, is expressed in XML which does not support reasoning
or identifying properties between class instances.
The aforementioned standards cannot parse multitudes of threat
advisory information and present it in ameaningful, human-readable,
actionable format that can be used by AI models [17] for prediction
or analysis. It is our observation that the earlier work focuses on
ontologies from specific threat vectors, such as malware. MALOnt
differs from these largely because the domain is beyond threat Due
to big data available in the cyber threat landscape, we strive to
create information extraction techniques that can perform auto-
mated analysis, enable reasoning, enhance inference capabilities
with minimal human intervention. This feature is currently lack-
ing in available standards. Therefore, we propose the use of Web
Ontology Language or OWL9 as the language for malware threat
knowledge representation and analysis.
3.2 Knowledge Graphs for Malware
Generating knowledge graphs for malware threat intelligence is an
emerging research area. This is partly due to a limited background
in KG and in adopting its concepts for security research. The paper
closest to MALOnt and the proposed malware KG is [15][14], where
a pipeline to create knowledge graphs from after action reports
(similar to threat reports) is proposed. Existing standards and vocab-
ularies in cybersecurity were used in conjunction with the threat
reports to prepare the training dataset for the cybersecurity KG. In
contrast, a combination of vector spaces and a knowledge graph
was proposed in [10]. Vector embedding can be more efficient in
searching similar nodes whereas knowledge graphs enable reason-
ing. These complementary strengths were used to build a pipeline
comprising knowledge extraction, representation, and querying of
data objects which performed better than its components.
Aside from these, multitude domain-specific knowledge graphs
have been built around an existing ontology or a generic knowledge
base such as WikiData[7, 20, 23], and made openly accessible to
the scientific community. While undoubtedly useful, they cater to
5https://cve.mitre.org/
6https://capec.mitre.org/
7https://attack.mitre.org/
8https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/10/openioc-basics.html
9https://www.w3.org/OWL/
generic concepts in the real world such as Person, Organization,
Location. To the best of our knowledge, there exists no open-source
knowledge graph in the malware threat intelligence domain that
captures sufficient details to enable large scale automated malware
threat analysis.
4 ONTOLOGY DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe the methodology and scope for defining
MALOnt classes and properties, the requirement criteria, MALOnt’s
intended application, as well as example classes and properties.
Figure 5: Using a Malware Ontology to construct a Malware
Knowledge Graph
4.1 Purpose and intended use of MALOnt
Malware threat reports are written in natural language and describe
malware attacks in detail. Information retrieval from such data feeds
can be unstructured in nature, which poses several challenges for
information extraction.
An ontology can serve the purpose of mapping disparate data
from multiple sources into a shared structure using a common vo-
cabulary that would further facilitate the collection, aggregation,
and analysis of that data[13]. Therefore, we propose MALOnt - a
malware ontology to encapsulate the concepts necessary to rep-
resent information regarding malware. The intended purpose of
MALOnt is threefold:
(1) To capture semantic information from threat reports by as-
signing individual entities or instances to a pre-defined class
in MALOnt and identifying properties where applicable.
(2) To use factual evidence present in the reports and infer new
connections and properties between instances.
(3) To serve as a foundation for creating a malware KG by popu-
lating MALOnt with individual instances from threat reports.
The steps required to achieve these goals are shown in a graph-
ical format in Figure 5. Once instantiated, MALOnt can extract
information such as the indicators of compromise, adversary infor-
mation, software vulnerabilities, attack tactics, and much more. It
would also assist researchers and security analysts who gather mal-
ware intelligence from unstructured sources. Furthermore, software
agents can utilize MALOnt to generate malware KGs.
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4.2 Competency Questions for MALOnt
Before creating an ontology, it’s requirements [11] should be gath-
ered, defined, and scoped by answering relevant competency ques-
tions. Having these competency questions act as the north star
when identifying pertinent classes and properties for proper cover-
age of the domain. SPARQL queries can either be used to answer
a question or a narrower version of a broad competency question
by running them on the instantiated ontology. For MALOnt, the
domain of the ontology is cybersecurity. In order to create the scope
within the larger cybersecurity domain, over two dozen threat re-
ports and existing ontology related sources (owl files, and research
papers) were reviewed. Key terms from the reports were identified
and the hierarchy of existing ontologies was studied. This helped
us vet out other ontologies, import relevant classes to MALOnt, and
create the class hierarchy that adequately covers different aspects
of malware threat intelligence. Below are the three competency
questions that broadly cover the scope of malware threat intelli-
gence:
(1) Which malware characteristics adequately define malware
threat landscape? (including methods, vulnerabilities, tar-
gets, and cybercriminals.)
(2) What are the similar features for grouping adversaries, mal-
ware to help understand their behavior and predict the future
course of action?
(3) What is the impact of a given malware on an organization
or industry? (financial, human life, intellectual property, rep-
utation)
4.3 Creating MALOnt
Designing and developing an ontology is an agile process. Three
stageswere continuously visited and reviewed based on core-competency
questions - reviewing threat reports, identifying classes, hierarchy,
data properties, and evaluating existing security ontologies. The
middle-out approach in creating ontology also covers the first two
stages. For MALOnt, many top-level classes were created with hier-
archy and data-properties abstracted from threat reports. Instances
were created for these classes by capturing individuals from threat
reports. In the rest of this section, we use examples to describe the
middle-out approach for building MALOnt.
The pre-defined upper-level classes such asMalware, incorporate
some of the most relevant details about a malware attack. Host,
Information, MalwareCharacteristics, Malware are extracted
from existing ontologies [3, 6, 21]. The family of a specific malware
is represented by MalwareFamily. These two classes are joined by
the property hasFamily where Malware class is its domain and
MalwareFamily class is the range.
Thereafter, we reviewed the competency questions defined in
Section 4.2 and identified classes such as Attacker, Organizations,
and Indicator. Over two dozen threat reports were manually re-
viewed to identify key concepts that needed to be included in the
ontology as new classes or properties. For example, threat reports
frequently provide valuable details about software vulnerabilities
exploited by the malware, as well as specific release or version
of the software product. In consequence, we included a Software
class with two properties hasReleaseYear and hasVersion. To connect
the instance for class Software to its vulnerability, hasVulnerability
property is introduced.
4.4 Exemplar Classes and Relations
Figure 6: Indicator class in MALOnt using OWLviz plugin in
Protege[12].
In this section, we list out and describe some of the top-level
classes and properties in MALOnt, which are essential to extract
information from malware threat reports.
• Malware: The general concept of malware, which is mali-
cious software intended to violate the integrity, availability,
or confidentiality of a computer system[8]. It has four sub-
classes.
• MalwareFamily: A group of malware with common proper-
ties. Often threat reports describe the behavior of a malware
family (see Figure 1) to help detect or prevent a novel mal-
ware belonging to that family.
• Attacker: An adversary or a cybercriminal who can cause
damage to a computer system by illegal methods. It is as-
sumed that all attackers in this class are humans.
• AttackerGroup: A group of cybercriminals who have ho-
mogeneous signatures of attack.
• ExploitTarget: An entity (a person or an organization) that
is the target of a malware attack.
• Indicator: Distinguishable artifacts in a computer system
that indicates malicious or suspicious behavior.
• Location: Geographic location of a place.
The Indicator class construct can be seen in Figure 6. Since
an indicator of compromise (IoC) can be of different forms (file,
email, hash, address), four sub-classes are created to define them.
Furthermore, a malware hash signature is of different types, and
the six sub-classes of the Hash cover them.
Next, we describe a few properties that represent the semantics of
the sentences and connect the instances in malware threat reports.
The domain is used to define property characteristics whereas range
enforces restrictions. Together they help maintain the integrity of
the ontology, contain the possibility of inconsistencies, or erroneous
conclusions by the automated reasoners.
• hasVulnerability: Bridges an exploit target or a software to
its vulnerability.
Domain: ExploitTarget, Software
Range: Vulnerability
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• hasAttachment: Creates link from a malicious email to the
attachment it contains
Domain: Email
Range: File
• indicates: Connects an indicator of compromise to its origin.
It has an inverse relation titled indicatedBy
Domain: Indicator
Range: Malware
• usesDropper: Connects a malware or an adversary to a fre-
quently used measure - a dropper.
Domain: Attacker, Malware, Campaign
Range: Dropper
• hasFamily: Maps a malware to its family. There is an inverse
relation of this named hasMember
Domain: Malware
Range: MalwareFamily
• hasCharacteristics: Maps a malware instance to its behavioral
attributes
Domain: Malware
Range: MalwareCharacteristics
Class specific properties, called datatype properties, are shown
in Figure 2. For example, the class Software has two properties-
hasVersion and hasReleaseYear.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate MALOnt by running SPARQL queries
on the ontology. These SPARQL queries answer to specific use
cases of the competency questions, explained in Section 4.2. This
method of evaluation is referred to as goal modeling [4] and is con-
sidered a very effective evaluation technique to test the adaptability
and consistency of an ontology [16]. If the SPARQL queries are
able to extract instances as a response, it signifies that the compe-
tency questions have succeeded in covering the defined goal of the
ontology.
(1) Retrieving threat information related tomalware char-
acteristics. Competency question 1 can have a specific use
case, where MALOnt is queried to extract attributes of dif-
ferent malware campaigns. MALOnt’s property targets is
selected from Campaign toOrganization to get a list of all
malware campaigns, their respective target organizations as
well as persons (see SPARQL query in Listing1).
Listing 1: SPARQL Query for Competency Question 1
SELECT DISTINCT ? i n s t a n c e ?p ?o
WHERE {
? i n s t a n c e a ?x .
? i n s t a n c e ?p ?o .
?p a owl : Ob j e c t P r op e r t y .
? x a owl : C l a s s .
? x r d f s : l a b e l
" Campaign "^^ xsd : s t r i n g .
?p r d f s : l a b e l " t a r g e t s "
}
(2) Retrieving similar features for grouping concepts. Com-
petency question no.2 can take various forms. Here, we show
a SPARQL query that leverages the inverse properties of
classes in MALOnt, to find all malware families whose mem-
ber malware have left a specific IoC footprint. In Figure 7,
each instance of Malware class in MALOnt is mapped to an
instance that belongs to classMalwareFamily using prop-
erty titled hasFamily. Alternatively, there is an inverse rela-
tion of hasFamily called hasMember.Malware instances
can also be mapped to Indicator instances using indicat-
edBy property. The inverse of this property is indicates.
Figure 7: Inverse properties in MALOnt using VOWL plugin
in Protege.
Once an IoC (defined by class Indicator) of a given malware
is extracted from a threat report, the property is identified,
which traces the malware back to the malware family. More
insights about a malware family can be gathered through
such chain properties between the three MALOnt classes. A
SPARQL query is executed for detecting instances of Mal-
wareFamily that have any member malware indicated by
an Indicator class. The SPARQL query traverses two kinds
of triple structures, ⟨MalwareFamily, hasMember, Malware⟩
and ⟨Malware, indicatedBy, Indicator⟩ in order to find the re-
sponse, see listing 2:
Listing 2: SPARQL Query for Competency Question 2
SELECT DISTINCT ? malware_ fami ly ?p
?malware ?q ? t
WHERE {
? malware_ fami ly ?p ?o .
? malware_ fami ly a ?x .
? x a owl : C l a s s .
? x r d f s : l a b e l " MalwareFamily "
^^ xsd : s t r i n g .
?p a owl : Ob j e c t P r op e r t y .
?p r d f s : l a b e l " hasMember " .
?malware ?q ? t .
?malware a ? z .
? z a owl : C l a s s .
?q a owl : Ob j e c t P r op e r t y .
?q r d f s : l a b e l " i n d i c a t e dBy "
^^ xsd : s t r i n g .
? t a owl : NamedInd iv idua l .
? t r d f s : l a b e l " i n d i c a t o r _ v a l u e "
}
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(3) Retrieving information on affected person or organi-
zation. For competency question no. 3, one can extract infor-
mation about affected systems, organizations, or person(s).
The SPARQL query in listing 3 retrieves a list of target objects,
and accessed information from those objects by a specific
attacker group. This query can retrieve all information of
a particular AttackerGroup entity using properties where
AttackerGroup is the domain.
Listing 3: SPARQL Query for Competency Question 3
SELECT DISTINCT ? i n s t a n c e ?p ?o ?q
WHERE {
? i n s t a n c e ?p ?o .
? i n s t a n c e a ?x .
? i n s t a n c e r d f s : l a b e l
" At tackerGroup1 "^^ xsd : s t r i n g .
?p a owl : Ob j e c t P r op e r t y .
? x a owl : C l a s s .
?p r d f s : l a b e l ?q .
?o a ? o b j e c t .
? o b j e c t a owl : C l a s s .
}
6 APPLICATION OF MALONT
In this section, we demonstrate the process of creating a part of the
KG (due to space constraints) by instantiating MALOnt with over
a dozen threat reports. We also explain how the reasoner can be
used to retrieve information by capturing it from multiple threat
reports by executing SPARQL queries on the exemplar KG.
6.1 Annotating Threat Reports
MALOnt has been instantiated with open-source threat reports10
that were published between the years 2006 to 2020. Many of these
reports have been published by reputed organizations working
within the cybersecurity domain. These reports provide a range of
coverage on malware threats prominent at the time of publication.
A few other reports focus on homogeneous attributes of various
attacks caused by malware. For example, a report 11 published in
2011 covers details on a set of operations called as Night Dragon.
Another report12 published in 2013, focusses on Night Dragon,
Stuxnet, and Shamoon. Annotating different kinds of reports in the
corpus allows deeper and wider range of details on a particular
malware attack.
Threat reports were manually annotated by the authors and re-
viewed by a security expert. The annotated values from the threat
reports were used to instantiate various concepts of MALOnt. In
this step, values are assigned to instances of MALOnt classes and
properties. In Figure 8 the snippet of the malware KG depicts model-
ing of threat data collected from reports using classes and properties
from the MALOnt ontology.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we propose MALOnt - an ontology for malware threat
intelligence by defines 68 classes, 31 properties, and 13 properties
10https://github.com/CyberMonitor/APT_CyberCriminal_Campagin_Collections/
11https://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/bpsa/Alerts%20DL/2011%20Alerts/A-2011-02-18-
01%20Night%20Dragon%20Attachment%201.pdf
12https://github.com/CyberMonitor/APT_CyberCriminal_Campagin_Collections/
blob/master/2013/energy-at-risk.pdf
Figure 8: Exemplar knowledge graph based on MALOnt in
neo4j
for representing malware attacks. While this is work in progress,
we used the middle-out approach for creating ontologies to review
the top classes as well as classes. As future work, MALOnt will
further formalize the implicit assumptions of the malware threat
domain in order to build a sustainable knowledge graph. For this,
annotated malware threat reports will be reviewed and instantiated
for MALOnt classes.
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